Which misspecifications persist?

DOI10.3982/TE5298MaRDI QIDQ6076925zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Drew Fudenberg, Giacomo Lanzani

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te5298

zbMATH Keywords

Berk-Nash equilibriumevolutionmisspecified learningpayoff monotone dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

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• Evolution and market behavior
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4072103 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3542363 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Measuring ``schmeduling
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• Robustness
• Three characterizations of population strategy stability
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Cited in

(4)

• Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs
• Endogenous clustering and analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Dynamic concern for misspecification
• Misspecified learning and evolutionary stability

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