Three characterizations of population strategy stability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3882247
DOI10.2307/3213023zbMath0439.92021OpenAlexW4250130709MaRDI QIDQ3882247
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3213023
attractorsNash equilibriumevolutionarily stable strategyESSconflict modelsco-operative strategiespopulation strategy stability
Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)
Related Items
Riemannian game dynamics, Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory, Learning in perturbed asymmetric games, Which misspecifications persist?, Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space, Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria, Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations, An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination, Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory, On the evolution of optimizing behavior, Evolutionary stability: One concept, several meanings, Frequency- and density-dependent selection: The two-phenotype model, Learning, matching, and aggregation, The mathematics of resource allocation in population biology. I: Interspecific competition, \(G\)-functions for the hermeneutic circle of evolution, Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space, Dynamics of games and genes: Discrete versus continuous time, Evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum games, Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models, Stability in an evolutionary game
