Riemannian game dynamics
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Publication:1622363
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.002zbMath1417.91102arXiv1603.09173OpenAlexW2962676888WikidataQ60142043 ScholiaQ60142043MaRDI QIDQ1622363
Panayotis Mertikopoulos, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 19 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.09173
replicator dynamicsreinforcement learningevolutionary game theoryRiemannian metricslearning in gamesprojection dynamics
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Manifolds of metrics (especially Riemannian) (58D17)
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