Domination or equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0025-5564(80)90039-5zbMath0452.92020OpenAlexW2056742226MaRDI QIDQ1148837

Ethan Akin

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0025-5564(80)90039-5

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumdominationevolutionary gameanimal population

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10)

Related Items (30)

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Cites Work

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• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• A new mathematical framework for the study of linkage and selection
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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