Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics

DOI10.3934/JDG.2022021zbMATH Open1505.91083arXiv2209.08416OpenAlexW4295135464MaRDI QIDQ2106068FDOQ2106068

Authors: Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Yannick Viossat 

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The literature on evolutionary game theory suggests that pure strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies always become extinct under imitative game dynamics, but they can survive under innovative dynamics. As we explain, this is because innovative dynamics favour rare strategies while standard imitative dynamics do not. However, as we also show, there are reasonable imitation protocols that favour rare or frequent strategies, thus allowing strictly dominated strategies to survive in large classes of imitation dynamics. Dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.08416

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zbMATH Keywords

survivalevolutionary game dynamicsrationalitydominated strategiesevolutionary game theoryimitation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Domination or equilibrium
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
• Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
• Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics

Cited In (6)

• The Hairy-Downy game: a model of interspecific social dominance mimicry
• Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning
• Survival benefits in mimicry: a quantitative framework
• Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
• Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
• Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies

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