Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics
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Publication:2106068
Abstract: The literature on evolutionary game theory suggests that pure strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies always become extinct under imitative game dynamics, but they can survive under innovative dynamics. As we explain, this is because innovative dynamics favour rare strategies while standard imitative dynamics do not. However, as we also show, there are reasonable imitation protocols that favour rare or frequent strategies, thus allowing strictly dominated strategies to survive in large classes of imitation dynamics. Dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.
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Cites work
- Domination or equilibrium
- Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
- Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
Cited in
(6)- Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
- Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning
- Survival benefits in mimicry: a quantitative framework
- The Hairy-Downy game: a model of interspecific social dominance mimicry
- Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
- Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
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