Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
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Publication:3095014
DOI10.3982/TE771zbMath1279.91028MaRDI QIDQ3095014
Josef Hofbauer, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
91A22: Evolutionary games
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Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection, Evolutionary Game Theory, Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games, Perturbations of set-valued dynamical systems, with applications to game theory, Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games, Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior, Game dynamics and Nash equilibria, Imitation in heterogeneous populations, Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit, The target projection dynamic, Stable games and their dynamics, Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies, Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics, Strictly dominated strategies in the replicator-mutator dynamics, Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play, Higher order game dynamics, The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic
