Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
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Publication:3095014
DOI10.3982/TE771zbMATH Open1279.91028OpenAlexW2153982278MaRDI QIDQ3095014FDOQ3095014
Authors: Josef Hofbauer, William H. Sandholm 
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te771
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Cited In (30)
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The target projection dynamic
- Signalling Victory to Ensure Dominance: A Continuous Model
- Dominated strategies in searching for evolutionary stable strategies
- Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
- Strictly dominated strategies in the replicator-mutator dynamics
- Imitation in heterogeneous populations
- Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
- Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games
- Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior
- Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
- Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
- Ordinal imitative dynamics
- Stable games and their dynamics
- Higher order game dynamics
- Game dynamics and Nash equilibria
- Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics
- Perturbations of set-valued dynamical systems, with applications to game theory
- The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic
- Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation
- Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
- Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
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