Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
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Publication:3095014
DOI10.3982/TE771zbMath1279.91028OpenAlexW2153982278MaRDI QIDQ3095014
Josef Hofbauer, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 28 October 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te771
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