Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.10.008zbMATH Open1168.91323OpenAlexW2029319251MaRDI QIDQ834880FDOQ834880

Authors: Gábor Virág 

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.008

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zbMATH Keywords

dynamic efficiencydynamic auctionsrent dissipationdynamic contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
• Competitive bidding and proprietary information

Cited In (2)

• Are inefficient entrepreneurs driven out of the market?
• Sorting in iterated incumbency contests

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