Higher order game dynamics

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.08.002zbMath1284.91046arXiv1206.4181WikidataQ60142081 ScholiaQ60142081MaRDI QIDQ2434241

Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Rida Laraki

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.4181

zbMATH Keywords

learning; replicator dynamics; stability of equilibria; game dynamics; (weakly) dominated strategies; higher-order dynamical systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A25: Dynamic games

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Continuous-Time Convergence Rates in Potential and Monotone Games, Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Learning in games with continuous action sets and unknown payoff functions, Distributed strategy-updating rules for aggregative games of multi-integrator systems with coupled constraints, A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory, Equilibrium selection of a homogenous duopoly with extrapolative foresight, Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies, Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization, Inertial Game Dynamics and Applications to Constrained Optimization, Penalty-Regulated Dynamics and Robust Learning Procedures in Games

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