Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games
Summary: We furnish a guide for the study of 2-dimensional evolutionary games in discrete time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are identified and nonlinear outcomes are explored. Besides the baseline payoffs of the established strategic interaction, the following elements are also vital to determine the dynamic outcome of a game: the initial fitness of each agent and the rule of motion that describes how individuals switch between strategies. In addition to the dynamic rule commonly used in evolutionary games, the replicator dynamics, we propose another rule, which acknowledges the role of expectations and sophisticates the replicator mechanism.
- A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics in public good games
- Infection and immunization: a new class of evolutionary game dynamics
- Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
- Local and global interactions in an evolutionary resource game
- Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
- The `hawk-dove' game and the speed of the evolutionary process in small heterogeneous populations
- The logic of animal conflict
- Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
- Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners
- Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games: some simulation results
- The role of pairwise nonlinear evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors game with noise
- Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand firms: exploring imitation and replicator processes
This page was built for publication: Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q444254)
