Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners
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Publication:1784331
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Cites work
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Cited in
(17)- Reflective evolution under strategic uncertainty
- Conditional rehabilitation of cooperation under strategic uncertainty
- Population learning in a model with random payoff landscapes and endogenous networks
- A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict
- Introducing disappointment dynamics and comparing behaviors in evolutionary games: some simulation results
- Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
- Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games
- Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint
- The unification of evolutionary dynamics through the Bayesian decay factor in a game on a graph
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection
- Evolution of social learning with payoff and content bias
- Continuous action iterated dilemma with data-driven compensation network and limited learning ability
- An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses.
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- Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
- Selfish optimization and collective learning in populations
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