Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners
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Publication:1784331
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.02.021zbMATH Open1397.91062OpenAlexW2085560336WikidataQ41824141 ScholiaQ41824141MaRDI QIDQ1784331FDOQ1784331
Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A. Nowak, Damien Zufferey
Publication date: 26 September 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc3322297
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Cited In (13)
- A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict
- Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection
- An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses.
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- Reflective Evolution Under Strategic Uncertainty
- Conditional rehabilitation of cooperation under strategic uncertainty
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- The unification of evolutionary dynamics through the Bayesian decay factor in a game on a graph
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- Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
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