A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict

DOI10.3934/KRM.2021014MaRDI QIDQ826032zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mikhail Perepelitsa

Publication date 18 December 2021

Published in Kinetic and Related Models (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.01265

zbMATH Keywords

Fokker-Planck equationcultural evolutionlearning in gameskinetic models in population dynamicsmulti-agent game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Fokker-Planck equations (35Q84) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16)

Abstract: We consider a model of cultural evolution for a strategy selection in a population of individuals who interact in a game theoretic framework. The evolution combines individual learning of the environment (population strategy profile), reproduction, proportional to the success of the acquired knowledge, and social transmission of the knowledge to the next generation. A mean-field type equation is derived that describes the dynamics of the distribution of cultural traits, in terms of the rate of learning, the reproduction rate and population size. We establish global well-posedness of the initial-boundary value problem for this equation and give several examples that illustrate the process of the cultural evolution for some classical games.

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(6)

• A two level mutation-selection model of cultural evolution and diversity
• Cultural evolution in a population of heterogeneous agents
• An evolutionary game-theoretic model for ethno-religious conflicts between two groups
• The asymmetric hawk-dove game with costs measured as time lost
• Convergence of knowledge in a stochastic cultural evolution model with population structure, social learning and credibility biases
• A model for the evolutionary diversification of religions

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