Selfish optimization and collective learning in populations

DOI10.1016/j.physd.2022.133426zbMath1498.91044arXiv2111.07776OpenAlexW3212567139MaRDI QIDQ2167991

Yoichiro Mori, Alex McAvoy, Joshua B. Plotkin

Publication date: 1 September 2022

Published in: Physica D (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.07776

zbMATH Keywords

populationrepeated gamemulti-agent learningcollective learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Reactive means in the iterated Prisoner's dilemma

Cites Work

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