Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1158743 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3062452 (Why is no real title available?)
- A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching.
- Almost global convergence to \(p\)-dominant equilibrium
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
- Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics
- Matrix Analysis
- Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
- Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
- Stable games and their dynamics
- Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
- Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
- The minority of three-game: an experimental and theoretical analysis
- Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
Cited in
(16)- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
- Excess payoff dynamics in games
- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
- Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior
- A new class of generalized Nash-population games via variational inequalities and fixed points
- Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
- Stable games and their dynamics
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics
- Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
- Tempered best response dynamics
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