Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria

DOI10.1007/S00182-005-0212-XMaRDI QIDQ2576649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michał Ramsza

Publication date 14 December 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0212-x

zbMATH Keywords

sampling dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(9)

• Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
• Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
• Stable biased sampling
• Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
• Stable sampling in repeated games
• Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
• Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
• Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
• Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior

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