Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game

DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0064-5zbMath1275.91018OpenAlexW2082610226MaRDI QIDQ384055

Michał Ramsza, Jacek Miekisz

Publication date: 25 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0064-5

zbMATH Keywords

ultimatum gamesocial normsampling dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

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• Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game
• Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
• Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
• Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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