Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
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Publication:384055
DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0064-5zbMATH Open1275.91018OpenAlexW2082610226MaRDI QIDQ384055FDOQ384055
Authors: Michał Ramsza, Jacek Miękisz
Publication date: 25 November 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0064-5
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Cites Work
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- The calculus of selfishness.
- Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
- Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
Cited In (11)
- Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
- Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior
- Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Strategies generalization and payoff fluctuation optimization in the iterated ultimatum game
- A reactive-Darwinian model for the ultimatum game: on the dominance of moderation in high diffusion
- Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
- The ultimatum game: discrete vs. continuous offers
- Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
- Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game
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