Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
From MaRDI portal
DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0753zbMATH Open0956.91025OpenAlexW3124453114MaRDI QIDQ1581909FDOQ1581909
Authors: Rajiv Sethi 
Publication date: 10 October 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0753
Recommendations
- Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach
- Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
- The stability of equilibrium point for uncertain game under bounded rationality
- Equilibria in large games with continuous procedures.
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the evolution of optimizing behavior
- Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics
Cited In (23)
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
- Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
- Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior
- Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Effects of players' random participation to the stability in LQ games
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
- Stability of equilibria for population games with uncertain parameters under bounded rationality
- The minority of three-game: an experimental and theoretical analysis
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
- Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
- Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
- Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics
- Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
- Can you guess the game you are playing?
- The role of information processing cost as the foundation of bounded rationality in game theory
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
This page was built for publication: Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1581909)
