Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0753zbMATH Open0956.91025OpenAlexW3124453114MaRDI QIDQ1581909FDOQ1581909

Authors Rajiv Sethi 

Publication date 10 October 2000

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0753

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game dynamicsbounded rationalitystable equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484411 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• On the evolution of optimizing behavior
• Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(23)

• Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior
• Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
• The role of information processing cost as the foundation of bounded rationality in game theory
• Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria
• Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
• Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics
• Can you guess the game you are playing?
• The minority of three-game: an experimental and theoretical analysis
• Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
• Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games
• Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics
• Stable sampling in repeated games
• Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
• Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
• Effects of players' random participation to the stability in LQ games
• Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
• Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
• Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
• Stability of equilibria for population games with uncertain parameters under bounded rationality

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