Strategy-specific barriers to learning and nonmonotonic selection dynamics

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0613zbMath0909.90287OpenAlexW2023928107MaRDI QIDQ1268648

Rajiv Sethi

Publication date: 18 October 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0613

zbMATH Keywords

learningreplicator dynamicsevolutionary gamesstable limit cycle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Related Items

Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games, Rapid evolution under inertia, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics, Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method, Escort evolutionary game theory, Evolutionary game dynamics, Evolutionary games with two timescales, Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players, Replicator Dynamics and Weak Pay-Off Positive Selection Dynamics: An Overview

Cites Work

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