Rapid evolution under inertia
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2389311
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.002zbMath1167.91319OpenAlexW2090102191MaRDI QIDQ2389311
Publication date: 15 July 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1fa063fd-aecb-4867-b898-562c75f0fc32
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