Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:617608
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.014zbMath1232.91044MaRDI QIDQ617608
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.11.014
stochastic stability; adaptive learning dynamics in games; escape dynamics; iterative cycle decomposition
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