``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
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Publication:2106067
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1581767 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3497890 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality
- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Cycles of learning in the centipede game
- Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information.
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
- Properties of Center Manifolds
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- Stability of the center-stable manifold
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- The stable, center-stable, center, center-unstable, unstable manifolds
Cited in
(6)- On the centipede game with a social norm
- Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
- Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
- Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
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