``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2106067
DOI10.3934/JDG.2021018zbMATH Open1505.91081OpenAlexW3163193002MaRDI QIDQ2106067FDOQ2106067
Authors: Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Luis R. Izquierdo 
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021018
Recommendations
- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- On learning to cooperate.
simulationcooperationevolutionary game dynamicsfinite populationbackwards inductioncentipede gamebest experienced payoff dynamics
Cites Work
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Properties of Center Manifolds
- The stable, center-stable, center, center-unstable, unstable manifolds
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stability of the center-stable manifold
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
- Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality
- Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information.
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- Cycles of learning in the centipede game
- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
Cited In (6)
- Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications
- Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
- Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- On the centipede game with a social norm
- Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
Uses Software
This page was built for publication: ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2106067)
