Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
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Publication:5963293
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.001zbMath1369.91017OpenAlexW2125326611MaRDI QIDQ5963293
Publication date: 7 March 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0745.pdf
convergencebackward-induction strategy profilebest-response dynamicsextensive formperfect informationself-confirming equilibrium
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Cites Work
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