Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.001zbMath1093.91008MaRDI QIDQ705858

Christoph Kuzmics

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

learning; backward induction; experimentation; subgame-perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A18: Games in extensive form

Related Items

Evolutionary Game Theory, Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games, The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument, On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations, Best response dynamics with level-\(n\) expectations in two-stage games, Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games, A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory

Cites Work

• The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
• From evolutionary to strategic stability.
• Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
• The simple geometry of perfect information games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions