Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105881zbMATH Open1544.91056MaRDI QIDQ6604770FDOQ6604770

Authors: Panayotis Mertikopoulos, William H. Sandholm 

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

similarity-based learningregularized learningnested logit choicenested pairwise proportional imitationnested replicator dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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