The dynamic stability of coalitionist behaviour for two-strategy bimatrix games

DOI10.1007/S11238-004-5641-7MaRDI QIDQ2487775zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ross Cressman, József Garay, A. Scarelli, Zoltan Varga

Publication date 8 August 2005

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5641-7

zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix game, replicator dynamics, imitation, coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• A theory for the evolutionary game
• Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games
• Evolutionarily stable coalition structure
• Two-population replicator dynamics and number of Nash equilibria in matrix games
• Coalitional stability conditions in multicriteria dynamic games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3257031 (Why is no real title available?)
• Domination or equilibrium
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Game theory
• Recurrence of the unfit

Cited in

(6)

• Evolutionary game model for a marketing cooperative with penalty for unfaithfulness
• Game-theoretical model for marketing cooperative in fisheries
• Dynamical analysis of a game network
• Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games
• A distributed replicator system corresponding to a bimatrix game
• Models of coalition or alliance formation

This page was built for publication: The dynamic stability of coalitionist behaviour for two-strategy bimatrix games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2487775)