The dynamic stability of coalitionist behaviour for two-strategy bimatrix games

DOI10.1007/S11238-004-5641-7zbMATH Open1107.91026OpenAlexW4241625290MaRDI QIDQ2487775FDOQ2487775

Authors: Ross Cressman, József Garay, A. Scarelli, Zoltan Varga 

Publication date: 8 August 2005

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5641-7

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zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix game, replicator dynamics, imitation, coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Domination or equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Recurrence of the unfit

Cited In (6)

• Game-theoretical model for marketing cooperative in fisheries
• Dynamical analysis of a game network
• Models of coalition or alliance formation
• A distributed replicator system corresponding to a bimatrix game
• Evolutionary game model for a marketing cooperative with penalty for unfaithfulness
• Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games

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