Cheap talk with coarse understanding
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Publication:2212741
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.015zbMath1452.91048OpenAlexW3049533921MaRDI QIDQ2212741
Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler
Publication date: 24 November 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.015
languagebounded rationalitycheap talkstrategic information transmissionanalogy-based expectationspure persuasion
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
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- Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
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