Communication under language barriers

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.12.009zbMath1419.91138OpenAlexW2910755566WikidataQ128616650 ScholiaQ128616650MaRDI QIDQ1729677

Siyang Xiong, Francesco Giovannoni

Publication date: 28 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/180413524/LB_20181106.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mediationcommunicationinformation transmissioncheap talklanguage barriersnoisy talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Linguistics (91F20)

Related Items (8)

The measurement of the value of a language ⋮ De-biasing strategic communication ⋮ Fragile meaning -- an experiment ⋮ Cheap talk with coarse understanding ⋮ Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response ⋮ Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games ⋮ Strategic interpretations ⋮ Reacting to ambiguous messages: an experimental analysis

Cites Work

• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
• Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Language Barriers
• Language and the Theory of the Firm
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Strategic Information Transmission

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