Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2682016
Recommendations
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games
- Learning, tracing, and risk dominance
- Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
- Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games.
Cites work
- Active learning with a misspecified prior
- Admissibility in Games
- Bayesian posteriors for arbitrarily rare events
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
- Learning and type compatibility in signaling games
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- On Forward Induction
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
- On the uniform consistency of Bayes estimates for multinomial probabilities
- Payoff information and learning in signaling games
- Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: a framework for robust predictions
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
Cited in
(2)
This page was built for publication: Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2682016)
