Learning and self-confirming long-run biases

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.07.009MaRDI QIDQ2324824zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 12 September 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:588

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionlearningself-confirming equilibriumstochastic control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory (91B06) Optimal stochastic control (93E20)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(11)

• Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
• Cultural transmission with incomplete information
• A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies
• Biased learning under ambiguous information
• Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
• A Normative Account of Confirmation Bias During Reinforcement Learning
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games
• Dynamic concern for misspecification
• Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making
• Learning underspecified models

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