Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information
DOI10.1007/S10479-015-1920-7zbMATH Open1348.91062DBLPjournals/anor/Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel16OpenAlexW805819252WikidataQ59472069 ScholiaQ59472069MaRDI QIDQ338910FDOQ338910
Authors: Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel 
Publication date: 7 November 2016
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1920-7
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competitive equilibriumCournot oligopolyNash equilibriumprisoner's dilemmanoncooperative games\(n\)-player dynamic gamesbelief-distorted Nash equilibrium (BDNE)common ecosystemdistorted informationgames with a continuum of playersminority gamepre-BDNEself-verification of beliefssubjective equilibrium
Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Discrete-time games (91A50) Public goods (91B18)
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Cited In (7)
- Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs
- New results on the existence of open loop Nash equilibria in discrete time dynamic games via generalized Nash games
- Linear quadratic game of exploitation of common renewable resources with inherent constraints
- Random Nash equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibria Under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty for Dynamic Games
- Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness
- A model for partial Kantian cooperation
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