A model for partial Kantian cooperation

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-56534-3_13zbMATH Open1497.91008arXiv1609.01921OpenAlexW2519983705MaRDI QIDQ2087129FDOQ2087129

Authors: Ioannis Kordonis 

Publication date: 26 October 2022

Abstract: In several game situations, the behavior of the players may depend not only on individual interests, but also on what each player considers as the correct thing to do. This work presents a game theoretic model, aiming to describe game situations in which the players' behavior is affected by ethical considerations. Particularly, we assume that they partially follow, Kant's `Categorical Imperative'. The model is stated for games with a continuum of players. The basic assumption made is that the participants perceive that they belong to virtual (imagined) groups, in which they optimize their actions as if they were bound to follow the same strategy. A partially cooperative equilibrium, called $r$-Kant-Nash equilibrium is then introduced. We then study the relationship of the $r$-Kant-Nash equilibrium with the Nash, (Bentham-) Harsanyi, Rawls difference and Roemer solutions. For the case where the set of possible player types is finite, we prove sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the $r$-Kant-Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium is characterized in terms of a variational inequality. For the case of continuous types, necessary conditions characterizing the partial Kantian equilibria are derived using a reduction to a set of optimal control problems. Finally, some numerical examples are given.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.01921

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperation in gamesKant's categorical imperative

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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Cited In (10)

• Universalization and altruism
• On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge
• Game-theoretic models of moral and other-regarding agents (extended abstract)
• Dynamic games of common-property resource exploitation when self-image matters
• On seeing and being seen
• Kantian equilibrium
• A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players
• Reflections on ethics and game theory
• A formalization of Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative
• Kant-Nash equilibria in a quantity-setting oligopoly

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