Abstract: Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency. We discuss these issues and show that common intuitions may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the implications of privacy concerns.
Recommendations
Cites work
- Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
- Dynamic psychological games
- Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
- Monopolistic signal provision
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Privacy Games
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
- The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice
Cited in
(8)
This page was built for publication: Perception games and privacy
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2013349)
