Perception games and privacy

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.006zbMath1393.91021arXiv1409.1487OpenAlexW2492702749MaRDI QIDQ2013349

Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.1487

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesprivacyperception games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Voting in the limelight ⋮ Anonymous Stochastic Routing ⋮ Menu mechanisms ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice ⋮ Privacy, patience, and protection

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
• Dynamic psychological games
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
• The Empirical Implications of Privacy-Aware Choice
• Monopolistic Signal Provision
• Privacy Games
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: Perception games and privacy