Perception games and privacy
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Publication:2013349
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.006zbMATH Open1393.91021arXiv1409.1487OpenAlexW2492702749MaRDI QIDQ2013349FDOQ2013349
Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency. We discuss these issues and show that common intuitions may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the implications of privacy concerns.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.1487
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Cites Work
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