Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5zbMath1328.91013OpenAlexW2120104019MaRDI QIDQ900144

Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Communication, information (94A99)

Related Items (8)

A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY ⋮ Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective ⋮ A belief-dependent utility model ⋮ Psychological games and sequential rationality ⋮ ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance ⋮ Perception games and privacy ⋮ Dynamic psychological games ⋮ Privacy, patience, and protection

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