Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5MaRDI QIDQ900144zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler

Publication date 1 January 2016

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Communication, information (94A99)

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Cites work

• Agreeing to disagree
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4152199 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3827625 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ordinality in non cooperative games
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi
• Sequential Equilibria
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Taken by surprise: the paradox of the surprise test revisited

Cited in

(8)

• Dynamic psychological games
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
• Perception games and privacy
• Privacy, patience, and protection
• A belief-dependent utility model
• Satisficing, preferences, and social interaction: a new perspective
• A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY

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