A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4090552 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488123 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- A comment on ``Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games by V. Bhaskar
- A model of noisy introspection.
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
- Cycles and instability in a rock-paper-scissors population game: a continuous time experiment
- Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
- Evolutionary games in natural, social, and virtual worlds
- Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies
- Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Hidden symmetries and focal points
- Higher order game dynamics
- Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence
- Multi-player matrix games
- Non-cooperative games
- Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions
- Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
- Professionals Play Minimax
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games.
- Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
- Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
- Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games
- Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria
- The Evolution of Conventions
- The logic of animal conflict
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
This page was built for publication: A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2206004)
