An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
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Publication:1260629
DOI10.1007/BF00182507zbMath0775.90088MaRDI QIDQ1260629
Robert Forsythe, Thomas A. Rietz, Robert J. Weber, Roger B. Myerson
Publication date: 31 August 1993
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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