Can the majority lose the election?

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0072-5MaRDI QIDQ843740zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bryan C. McCannon

Publication date 15 January 2010

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0072-5

zbMATH Keywords

plurality votingendogenous candidatesmajority losingnon-Duvergerian outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• How majorities can lose the election: another voting paradox
• Majority rule when voters like to win
• Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
• Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
• The plurality majority converse under single peakedness

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
• How two-party competition treats minorities
• Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(5)

• The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
• Alienation, indifference and the choice of ideological position
• The drastic outcomes from voting alliances in three-party democratic voting (1990 \(\rightarrow\) 2013)
• How majorities can lose the election: another voting paradox
• Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule

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