Can the majority lose the election?
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Publication:843740
DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0072-5zbMATH Open1195.91031OpenAlexW3123749015MaRDI QIDQ843740FDOQ843740
Authors: Bryan C. McCannon
Publication date: 15 January 2010
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0072-5
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
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- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
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- How two-party competition treats minorities
- An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
- Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
Cited In (5)
- The plurality majority converse under single peakedness
- The drastic outcomes from voting alliances in three-party democratic voting (1990 \(\rightarrow\) 2013)
- Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
- Alienation, indifference and the choice of ideological position
- How majorities can lose the election: another voting paradox
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