The power of suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior
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Publication:2765545
Cited in
(28)- When consumers do not make an active decision: dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects
- Default effects, transaction costs, and imperfect information
- Welfare analysis when choice is status-quo biased
- Self-coordination in time inconsistent stochastic decision problems: a planner-doer game framework
- Exclusive shortlisting choice with reference
- Social network influence and market instability
- Regret, portfolio choice, and guarantees in defined contribution schemes
- Reference dependent ambiguity
- Differentiating roles of the reference alternative
- Learning to be prepared
- Buridanic competition
- Eliciting risk preferences and elasticity of substitution
- Opinions and networks: how do they effect each other
- The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games
- Status quo bias, multiple priors and uncertainty aversion
- Limited attention and status quo bias
- Rational choice with status quo bias
- Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs
- Sustainability of participation in collective pension schemes: an option pricing approach
- Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias
- Rational consumers
- Optimal Asset Allocation for Retirement Saving: Deterministic Vs. Time Consistent Adaptive Strategies
- Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
- Self-control preferences and status-quo bias
- Tempered best response dynamics
- Status quo bias with choice overload
- Policyholder exercise behavior in life insurance: the state of affairs
- Understanding the reference effect
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