The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior
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Publication:2765545
DOI10.1162/003355301753265543zbMath0989.91547OpenAlexW3124550172MaRDI QIDQ2765545
Dennis F. Shea, Brigitte C. Madrian
Publication date: 24 January 2002
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301753265543
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