The lower convergence tendency of imitators compared to best responders
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2116659
DOI10.1016/J.AUTOMATICA.2022.110185zbMATH Open1485.93046OpenAlexW4220667006MaRDI QIDQ2116659FDOQ2116659
Ming Cao, James Riehl, Pouria Ramazi
Publication date: 18 March 2022
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2022.110185
Recommendations
- Imitative behavior in a two-population model
- Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium
- Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games
- Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games
- Consensus and information cascades in game-theoretic imitation dynamics with static and dynamic network topologies
Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Multi-agent systems (93A16) Networked control (93B70)
Cites Work
- Exploring complex networks
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games
- A dynamic model of social network formation
- Evolutionary game theoretic demand-side management and control for a class of networked smart grid
- Semi-tensor product approach to networked evolutionary games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
- Multi-agent discrete-time graphical games and reinforcement learning solutions
- On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games
- Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks
- The stability of imitation dynamics with discrete distributed delays
- Constrained evolutionary games by using a mixture of imitation dynamics
- Conformity in voting
- A game of alignment: collective behavior of multi-species
- Consensus and Information Cascades in Game-Theoretic Imitation Dynamics with Static and Dynamic Network Topologies
- Asynchronous Decision-Making Dynamics Under Best-Response Update Rule in Finite Heterogeneous Populations
- Heterogeneous Mixed Populations of Best-Responders and Imitators: Equilibrium Convergence and Stability
- Self-Triggered Best-Response Dynamics for Continuous Games
Cited In (1)
This page was built for publication: The lower convergence tendency of imitators compared to best responders
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2116659)
