Event corruption: a game theoretic approach

DOI10.13164/MA.2018.12MaRDI QIDQ5742098zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Kjetil K. Haugen, Harry A. Solberg

Publication date 16 May 2019

Published in Mathematics for Application (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.13164/ma.2018.12

zbMATH Keywords

Bribe equilibriumeconomics of corruptioneconomics of dopinggame theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99)

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Cited in

(2)

• Riding high: success in sports and the rise of doping cultures
• Match-fixing under competitive odds

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