Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
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Publication:1991934
Recommendations
- The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy
- Optimal monetary policy under uncertainty.
- Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium
- Optimal monetary policy in a Phillips-curve world
- Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output
Cites work
- IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION THROUGH INFLATION TARGETING
- Limited asset markets participation, monetary policy and (inverted) aggregate demand logic
- Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing
- The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy
- Using a projection method to analyze inflation bias in a micro-founded model
Cited in
(8)- Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule
- Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
- Price level targeting and the delegation issue in an open economy
- Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium
- Heterogeneity and monetary policy
- Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output
- Central bank reputation in a forward-looking model
- The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy
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