Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.021zbMATH Open1292.91134OpenAlexW1993636555MaRDI QIDQ2452992FDOQ2452992

Authors: Peter Tillmann 

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021

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zbMATH Keywords

Knightian uncertaintyrobust controlmonetary policypotential outputmonetary delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Robustness
• Uncertain potential output: Implications for monetary policy
• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORK
• Endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output

Cited In (11)

• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES
• Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited
• Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
• Robustly optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with housing
• Robust policies in a sticky information economy
• Monetary policy under misspecified expectations
• Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
• Rogoff revisited: The conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies
• Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule
• An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers
• Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty

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