Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.021MaRDI QIDQ2452992zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Tillmann

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.021

zbMATH Keywords

Knightian uncertaintyrobust controlmonetary policypotential outputmonetary delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES
• Robust monetary policy with misspecified models: Does model uncertainty always call for attenuated policy?
• Monetary policy under misspecified expectations
• Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation
• Optimal monetary policy under parameter uncertainty in a simple microfounded model
• Optimal monetary policy with uncertain fundamentals and dispersed information
• Optimal random monetary policy with nominal rigidity.
• MONETARY POLICY RULES UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, ADAPTIVE LEARNING, AND ROBUST CONTROL
• Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies

Cites work

• Endogenous monetary policy with unobserved potential output
• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORK
• Robustness
• Uncertain potential output: Implications for monetary policy

Cited in

(11)

• Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited
• ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES
• Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
• Robustly optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with housing
• Robust policies in a sticky information economy
• Monetary policy under misspecified expectations
• Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency
• Rogoff revisited: The conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies
• Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule
• An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers
• Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty

This page was built for publication: Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452992)