Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.05.020MaRDI QIDQ2446255zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marcelo Sánchez

Publication date 16 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.020

zbMATH Keywords

calibrationcentral bank transparencymonetary strictnessoptimal delegationwage setting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites work

• How much should central banks talk?: A new argument
• Monetary accommodation and unemployment: why central bank transparency matters
• The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*

Cited in

(3)

• Targeted disclosure and monetary policy flexibility: a simple model
• A Leviathan central bank: modeling seigniorage in a money search model
• Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output

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