Targeted disclosure and monetary policy flexibility: a simple model

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109371MaRDI QIDQ2208834zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Prasanna Gai, Edmund Lou, Sherry X. Wu

Publication date 4 November 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109371

zbMATH Keywords

market expectationscentral bank communicationtargeted disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• Combining Probability Distributions from Dependent Information Sources
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks

Cited in

(2)

• Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure

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