Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.05.009zbMATH Open1254.91512OpenAlexW2092668669MaRDI QIDQ1925884FDOQ1925884

Authors: Peter Tillmann 

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56552

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zbMATH Keywords

robustnessoptimal monetary policyTaylor rulestabilization biasmonetary policy delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• The non-optimality of proposed monetary policy rules under timeless perspective commitment

Cited In (4)

• RE-EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW CONSENSUS: ENDOGENOUS MONEY AND TAYLOR RULES IN A SIMPLE NEOCLASSICAL MACRO MODEL
• Modeling changes in US monetary policy with a time-varying nonlinear Taylor rule
• Cross-checking monetary policy and equilibrium determinacy under interest rate stabilization
• Optimal monetary policy in the generalized Taylor economy

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