The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy

DOI10.1007/S10957-011-9847-XzbMATH Open1233.91190OpenAlexW2052449767MaRDI QIDQ650215FDOQ650215

Authors: Florin O. Bilbiie 

Publication date: 25 November 2011

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-011-9847-x

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zbMATH Keywords

commitmentmonetary policyoptimal delegationtime-inconsistencycentral bankinginflation contracts and targets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Some thoughts on rational expectations models, and alternate formulations
• Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy.

Cited In (3)

• Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
• Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
• Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium

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