The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy

DOI10.1007/S10957-011-9847-XMaRDI QIDQ650215zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Florin O. Bilbiie

Publication date 25 November 2011

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-011-9847-x

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentmonetary policyoptimal delegationtime-inconsistencycentral bankinginflation contracts and targets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium
• Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
• Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution
• The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game
• The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Cites work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Expectations, credibility, and time-consistent monetary policy.
• Social choice and individual values
• Some thoughts on rational expectations models, and alternate formulations

Cited in

(3)

• Delegating optimal monetary policy inertia
• Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
• Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium

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