Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189220 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1568776 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- A general class of adaptive strategies
- A proof of calibration via Blackwell's approachability theorem.
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- An easier way to calibrate.
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Asymptotic calibration
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information
- Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
- Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
- On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games
- Potential games
- Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Regret in the on-line decision problem
- The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
Cited in
(33)- Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
- How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
- Learning by trial and error
- Learning to coordinate in social networks
- The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
- Learning in Games
- Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
- Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
- Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
- Generalised weakened fictitious play
- Learning in games with unstable equilibria
- Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
- Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
- Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
- Multi-agent learning for engineers
- Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibrium
- Behavioral model summarisation for other agents under uncertainty
- Merging and testing opinions
- Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games
- A Constructive Proof that Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Nash Equilibria
- The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Conflicting evidence and decisions by agency professionals: an experimental test in the context of Merger regulation
- On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules
- Online discrete optimization in social networks in the presence of Knightian uncertainty
- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium
- Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria
- A note on bimatrix games with an unknown payoff matrix
- Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria
- Learning in general games with Nature's moves
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