An easier way to calibrate.

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0726zbMath1131.91310MaRDI QIDQ1818288

David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 4 January 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203773

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A35: Decision theory for games

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Cites Work

• Consistency and cautious fictitious play
• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• A proof of calibration via Blackwell's approachability theorem.
• Calibrated forecasting and merging
• Self-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist
• Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
• The Well-Calibrated Bayesian
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