Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.03.003zbMath1411.91070OpenAlexW2923575045MaRDI QIDQ2416639

Ron Peretz, Gilad Bavly

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfinite automataequilibrium payoffsbounded complexitybounded recallconcealed correlation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Correlation through bounded recall strategies
• The strategic value of recall
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Repeated games with finite automata
• Repeated games with bounded entropy
• Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
• Approachability with bounded memory
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
• Elements of Information Theory
• On the Complexity of Coordination
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