Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
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Publication:2416639
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.03.003zbMath1411.91070OpenAlexW2923575045MaRDI QIDQ2416639
Publication date: 24 May 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.003
repeated gamesfinite automataequilibrium payoffsbounded complexitybounded recallconcealed correlation
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