Correlation through bounded recall strategies

DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0334-XzbMath1296.91026OpenAlexW2059938204MaRDI QIDQ378336

Ron Peretz

Publication date: 11 November 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp579.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

folk theorembounded recallconcealed correlationsecret correlation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

The complexity of interacting automata ⋮ Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory ⋮ The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem ⋮ Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The strategic value of recall
• Complexity and effective prediction
• Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Repeated games with finite automata
• Repeated games with bounded entropy
• Bernoulli shifts with the same entropy are isomorphic
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Elements of Information Theory

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