Correlation through bounded recall strategies

DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0334-XMaRDI QIDQ378336zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ron Peretz

Publication date 11 November 2013

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp579.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

folk theorembounded recallconcealed correlationsecret correlation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
• Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
• Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
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Cites work

• Bernoulli shifts with the same entropy are isomorphic
• Complexity and effective prediction
• Elements of Information Theory
• Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
• Repeated games with bounded entropy
• Repeated games with finite automata
• Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies
• Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The probabilistic method. With an appendix on the life and work of Paul Erdős.
• The strategic value of recall

Cited in

(6)

• Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies
• Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
• Better-reply dynamics with bounded recall
• The complexity of interacting automata
• Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory
• Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall

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