Correlation through bounded recall strategies
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Publication:378336
DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0334-xzbMath1296.91026MaRDI QIDQ378336
Publication date: 11 November 2013
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp579.pdf
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