Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00857-0MaRDI QIDQ6183346zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chirantan Ganguly, Indrajit Ray

Publication date 4 January 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00857-0

zbMATH Keywords

Battle of the Sexescheap talkcoordinationrevelation of informationsymmetric equilibriumtruthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
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Cites work

• A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
• A model of expertise
• A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Arms Races and Negotiations
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Communication in Cournot oligopoly
• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games
• Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
• Long Cheap Talk
• Mediation and peace
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Promises and Partnership
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Unmediated and mediated communication equilibria of battle of the sexes with incomplete information
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

Cited in

(3)

• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Coordination and weak announcement proofness: Two comments on ``Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Communicating in a coordination game with private information

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