Coordination and private information revelation
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Publication:1630500
DOI10.3390/g9030064zbMath1418.91094OpenAlexW2891849603MaRDI QIDQ1630500
Debdatta Saha, Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Publication date: 10 December 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030064
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